Suppose a player in a game has a dominant strategy, but they threaten to take another action. Can this threat be credible?

A) No, such threats are never credible to other rational players.
B) No, if the player has a dominant strategy, they must take this action.
C) Yes, if they can link the current game to another bargaining problem in which their joint strategy for the combined games is rational.
D) Yes, dominant strategies may not always yield the highest payoffs.

If the player can link the current game to another bargaining problem in which their joint strategy for the combined games is rational, then they might have a credible threat that can be used as a bargaining tool. This is because the other players would consider the potential consequences of the threat in the larger game and adjust their actions accordingly, even if it means deviating from a dominant strategy. In cases where a dominant strategy does not yield the highest payoff, the player may also have a credible threat as they may prefer to deviate from the dominant strategy to increase their overall payoff.