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Raahim Pathan

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The study of business law does not involve an ethical dimension.

On Jul 22, 2024

False
RP

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Reliability is the probability that a machine part or product will function properly for a specified time regardless of conditions.

On Jul 18, 2024

False
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A company paid $150,000,plus a 7% commission and $5,000 in closing costs for a property.The property included land appraised at $87,500,land improvements appraised at $35,000,and a building appraised at $52,500.What should be the allocation of this property's costs in the company's accounting records?

A) Land $75,000; Land Improvements,$30,000; Building,$45,000.
B) Land $75,000; Land Improvements,$30,800; Building,$46,200.
C) Land $82,750; Land Improvements,$33,100; Building,$49,650.
D) Land $80,250; Land Improvements,$32,100; Building,$48,150.
E) Land $77,500; Land Improvements; $31,000; Building; $46,500.

On Jun 21, 2024

C
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Smog Corporation and Grimy Corporation emit pollution in their production processes. The local government has established a standard for the pollution levels of Smog Corporation and Grimy Corporation of 25,000 units of pollution. To ensure this level of pollution, the government has allocated 15,000 pollution permits to Smog Corporation and 10,000 pollution permits to Grimy Corporation. Smog Corporation has the following demand function for pollution emission permits: Smog Corporation and Grimy Corporation emit pollution in their production processes. The local government has established a standard for the pollution levels of Smog Corporation and Grimy Corporation of 25,000 units of pollution. To ensure this level of pollution, the government has allocated 15,000 pollution permits to Smog Corporation and 10,000 pollution permits to Grimy Corporation. Smog Corporation has the following demand function for pollution emission permits: Grimy Corporation's demand function for pollution emission permits is: Is the government's allocation of pollution permits efficient? If the government allowed the corporations to trade permits, would the firms be motivated to trade? If so, what would be the efficient level of trading? Grimy Corporation's demand function for pollution emission permits is: Smog Corporation and Grimy Corporation emit pollution in their production processes. The local government has established a standard for the pollution levels of Smog Corporation and Grimy Corporation of 25,000 units of pollution. To ensure this level of pollution, the government has allocated 15,000 pollution permits to Smog Corporation and 10,000 pollution permits to Grimy Corporation. Smog Corporation has the following demand function for pollution emission permits: Grimy Corporation's demand function for pollution emission permits is: Is the government's allocation of pollution permits efficient? If the government allowed the corporations to trade permits, would the firms be motivated to trade? If so, what would be the efficient level of trading? Is the government's allocation of pollution permits efficient? If the government allowed the corporations to trade permits, would the firms be motivated to trade? If so, what would be the efficient level of trading?

On Jun 18, 2024

The current allocation of permits is not efficient. We may rearrange each firms demand function for pollution permits to determine their marginal benefit of emitting pollution. This implies Smog Corporations marginal benefit of polluting is: The current allocation of permits is not efficient. We may rearrange each firms demand function for pollution permits to determine their marginal benefit of emitting pollution. This implies Smog Corporations marginal benefit of polluting is: Grimy Corporation's marginal benefit of polluting is: At the current pollution allocation, Smog Corporation's marginal benefit is: However, Grimy corporation's marginal benefit is: Since the marginal benefit of polluting is much higher to Grimy Corporation, the current allocation of pollution permits is not optimal. Grimy Corporation is willing to pay $7,500 for a permit at the government's allocation while the marginal value of a permit to Smog Corporation is zero. Thus, there is a trade opportunity. If the government allowed the firms to trade the permits, the optimal allocation sets: Note that So, the MB = MB ⇒ efficient allocation requires: = 14,000. The efficient level of permits for Grimy Corporation is then 11,000. The marginal benefit of a permit for Smog Corporation if it uses 14,000 permits is $5,000. Grimy Corporation is willing to pay $5,000 per permit to purchase 1,000 permits from Smog Corporation. Both firms are better off and society has achieved the efficient allocation of pollution permits. Grimy Corporation's marginal benefit of polluting is: The current allocation of permits is not efficient. We may rearrange each firms demand function for pollution permits to determine their marginal benefit of emitting pollution. This implies Smog Corporations marginal benefit of polluting is: Grimy Corporation's marginal benefit of polluting is: At the current pollution allocation, Smog Corporation's marginal benefit is: However, Grimy corporation's marginal benefit is: Since the marginal benefit of polluting is much higher to Grimy Corporation, the current allocation of pollution permits is not optimal. Grimy Corporation is willing to pay $7,500 for a permit at the government's allocation while the marginal value of a permit to Smog Corporation is zero. Thus, there is a trade opportunity. If the government allowed the firms to trade the permits, the optimal allocation sets: Note that So, the MB = MB ⇒ efficient allocation requires: = 14,000. The efficient level of permits for Grimy Corporation is then 11,000. The marginal benefit of a permit for Smog Corporation if it uses 14,000 permits is $5,000. Grimy Corporation is willing to pay $5,000 per permit to purchase 1,000 permits from Smog Corporation. Both firms are better off and society has achieved the efficient allocation of pollution permits. At the current pollution allocation, Smog Corporation's marginal benefit is: The current allocation of permits is not efficient. We may rearrange each firms demand function for pollution permits to determine their marginal benefit of emitting pollution. This implies Smog Corporations marginal benefit of polluting is: Grimy Corporation's marginal benefit of polluting is: At the current pollution allocation, Smog Corporation's marginal benefit is: However, Grimy corporation's marginal benefit is: Since the marginal benefit of polluting is much higher to Grimy Corporation, the current allocation of pollution permits is not optimal. Grimy Corporation is willing to pay $7,500 for a permit at the government's allocation while the marginal value of a permit to Smog Corporation is zero. Thus, there is a trade opportunity. If the government allowed the firms to trade the permits, the optimal allocation sets: Note that So, the MB = MB ⇒ efficient allocation requires: = 14,000. The efficient level of permits for Grimy Corporation is then 11,000. The marginal benefit of a permit for Smog Corporation if it uses 14,000 permits is $5,000. Grimy Corporation is willing to pay $5,000 per permit to purchase 1,000 permits from Smog Corporation. Both firms are better off and society has achieved the efficient allocation of pollution permits. However, Grimy corporation's marginal benefit is: The current allocation of permits is not efficient. We may rearrange each firms demand function for pollution permits to determine their marginal benefit of emitting pollution. This implies Smog Corporations marginal benefit of polluting is: Grimy Corporation's marginal benefit of polluting is: At the current pollution allocation, Smog Corporation's marginal benefit is: However, Grimy corporation's marginal benefit is: Since the marginal benefit of polluting is much higher to Grimy Corporation, the current allocation of pollution permits is not optimal. Grimy Corporation is willing to pay $7,500 for a permit at the government's allocation while the marginal value of a permit to Smog Corporation is zero. Thus, there is a trade opportunity. If the government allowed the firms to trade the permits, the optimal allocation sets: Note that So, the MB = MB ⇒ efficient allocation requires: = 14,000. The efficient level of permits for Grimy Corporation is then 11,000. The marginal benefit of a permit for Smog Corporation if it uses 14,000 permits is $5,000. Grimy Corporation is willing to pay $5,000 per permit to purchase 1,000 permits from Smog Corporation. Both firms are better off and society has achieved the efficient allocation of pollution permits. Since the marginal benefit of polluting is much higher to Grimy Corporation, the current allocation of pollution permits is not optimal. Grimy Corporation is willing to pay $7,500 for a permit at the government's allocation while the marginal value of a permit to Smog Corporation is zero. Thus, there is a trade opportunity. If the government allowed the firms to trade the permits, the optimal allocation sets: The current allocation of permits is not efficient. We may rearrange each firms demand function for pollution permits to determine their marginal benefit of emitting pollution. This implies Smog Corporations marginal benefit of polluting is: Grimy Corporation's marginal benefit of polluting is: At the current pollution allocation, Smog Corporation's marginal benefit is: However, Grimy corporation's marginal benefit is: Since the marginal benefit of polluting is much higher to Grimy Corporation, the current allocation of pollution permits is not optimal. Grimy Corporation is willing to pay $7,500 for a permit at the government's allocation while the marginal value of a permit to Smog Corporation is zero. Thus, there is a trade opportunity. If the government allowed the firms to trade the permits, the optimal allocation sets: Note that So, the MB = MB ⇒ efficient allocation requires: = 14,000. The efficient level of permits for Grimy Corporation is then 11,000. The marginal benefit of a permit for Smog Corporation if it uses 14,000 permits is $5,000. Grimy Corporation is willing to pay $5,000 per permit to purchase 1,000 permits from Smog Corporation. Both firms are better off and society has achieved the efficient allocation of pollution permits. Note that The current allocation of permits is not efficient. We may rearrange each firms demand function for pollution permits to determine their marginal benefit of emitting pollution. This implies Smog Corporations marginal benefit of polluting is: Grimy Corporation's marginal benefit of polluting is: At the current pollution allocation, Smog Corporation's marginal benefit is: However, Grimy corporation's marginal benefit is: Since the marginal benefit of polluting is much higher to Grimy Corporation, the current allocation of pollution permits is not optimal. Grimy Corporation is willing to pay $7,500 for a permit at the government's allocation while the marginal value of a permit to Smog Corporation is zero. Thus, there is a trade opportunity. If the government allowed the firms to trade the permits, the optimal allocation sets: Note that So, the MB = MB ⇒ efficient allocation requires: = 14,000. The efficient level of permits for Grimy Corporation is then 11,000. The marginal benefit of a permit for Smog Corporation if it uses 14,000 permits is $5,000. Grimy Corporation is willing to pay $5,000 per permit to purchase 1,000 permits from Smog Corporation. Both firms are better off and society has achieved the efficient allocation of pollution permits. So, the
MB The current allocation of permits is not efficient. We may rearrange each firms demand function for pollution permits to determine their marginal benefit of emitting pollution. This implies Smog Corporations marginal benefit of polluting is: Grimy Corporation's marginal benefit of polluting is: At the current pollution allocation, Smog Corporation's marginal benefit is: However, Grimy corporation's marginal benefit is: Since the marginal benefit of polluting is much higher to Grimy Corporation, the current allocation of pollution permits is not optimal. Grimy Corporation is willing to pay $7,500 for a permit at the government's allocation while the marginal value of a permit to Smog Corporation is zero. Thus, there is a trade opportunity. If the government allowed the firms to trade the permits, the optimal allocation sets: Note that So, the MB = MB ⇒ efficient allocation requires: = 14,000. The efficient level of permits for Grimy Corporation is then 11,000. The marginal benefit of a permit for Smog Corporation if it uses 14,000 permits is $5,000. Grimy Corporation is willing to pay $5,000 per permit to purchase 1,000 permits from Smog Corporation. Both firms are better off and society has achieved the efficient allocation of pollution permits. = MB The current allocation of permits is not efficient. We may rearrange each firms demand function for pollution permits to determine their marginal benefit of emitting pollution. This implies Smog Corporations marginal benefit of polluting is: Grimy Corporation's marginal benefit of polluting is: At the current pollution allocation, Smog Corporation's marginal benefit is: However, Grimy corporation's marginal benefit is: Since the marginal benefit of polluting is much higher to Grimy Corporation, the current allocation of pollution permits is not optimal. Grimy Corporation is willing to pay $7,500 for a permit at the government's allocation while the marginal value of a permit to Smog Corporation is zero. Thus, there is a trade opportunity. If the government allowed the firms to trade the permits, the optimal allocation sets: Note that So, the MB = MB ⇒ efficient allocation requires: = 14,000. The efficient level of permits for Grimy Corporation is then 11,000. The marginal benefit of a permit for Smog Corporation if it uses 14,000 permits is $5,000. Grimy Corporation is willing to pay $5,000 per permit to purchase 1,000 permits from Smog Corporation. Both firms are better off and society has achieved the efficient allocation of pollution permits. ⇒
efficient allocation requires: The current allocation of permits is not efficient. We may rearrange each firms demand function for pollution permits to determine their marginal benefit of emitting pollution. This implies Smog Corporations marginal benefit of polluting is: Grimy Corporation's marginal benefit of polluting is: At the current pollution allocation, Smog Corporation's marginal benefit is: However, Grimy corporation's marginal benefit is: Since the marginal benefit of polluting is much higher to Grimy Corporation, the current allocation of pollution permits is not optimal. Grimy Corporation is willing to pay $7,500 for a permit at the government's allocation while the marginal value of a permit to Smog Corporation is zero. Thus, there is a trade opportunity. If the government allowed the firms to trade the permits, the optimal allocation sets: Note that So, the MB = MB ⇒ efficient allocation requires: = 14,000. The efficient level of permits for Grimy Corporation is then 11,000. The marginal benefit of a permit for Smog Corporation if it uses 14,000 permits is $5,000. Grimy Corporation is willing to pay $5,000 per permit to purchase 1,000 permits from Smog Corporation. Both firms are better off and society has achieved the efficient allocation of pollution permits. The current allocation of permits is not efficient. We may rearrange each firms demand function for pollution permits to determine their marginal benefit of emitting pollution. This implies Smog Corporations marginal benefit of polluting is: Grimy Corporation's marginal benefit of polluting is: At the current pollution allocation, Smog Corporation's marginal benefit is: However, Grimy corporation's marginal benefit is: Since the marginal benefit of polluting is much higher to Grimy Corporation, the current allocation of pollution permits is not optimal. Grimy Corporation is willing to pay $7,500 for a permit at the government's allocation while the marginal value of a permit to Smog Corporation is zero. Thus, there is a trade opportunity. If the government allowed the firms to trade the permits, the optimal allocation sets: Note that So, the MB = MB ⇒ efficient allocation requires: = 14,000. The efficient level of permits for Grimy Corporation is then 11,000. The marginal benefit of a permit for Smog Corporation if it uses 14,000 permits is $5,000. Grimy Corporation is willing to pay $5,000 per permit to purchase 1,000 permits from Smog Corporation. Both firms are better off and society has achieved the efficient allocation of pollution permits. = 14,000.
The efficient level of permits for Grimy Corporation is then 11,000. The marginal benefit of a permit for Smog Corporation if it uses 14,000 permits is $5,000. Grimy Corporation is willing to pay $5,000 per permit to purchase 1,000 permits from Smog Corporation. Both firms are better off and society has achieved the efficient allocation of pollution permits.
RP

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When the market rate of interest is equal to the contract rate of interest, the bonds should sell at

A) a premium
B) par
C) an inflation-adjusted discount
D) a discount

On May 21, 2024

B
RP

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Usury laws lead to a ________________ of loanable funds.

On May 18, 2024

shortage